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Abstract
In this paper, we present M ARKETECTURE, an agent-based, microeconomic, scalable model for
studying deregulated power markets. Features that distinguish it from previously studied models include: the ability to generate individualistic, demographics based, elastic demand profiles; a highly
configurable system that supports different matching algorithms for buyers and sellers, different market
clearing mechanisms; ability to aggregate individuals to different classes; an electrical grid to physically
clear the economic contracts etc. This paper describes the model and its various features in detail. A case
study is done for the city of Portland, Oregon, to evaluate the performance and efficiency of the market
under different market clearing algorithms and sellers’ strategies. We analyze the structural properties
of the market under different scenarios to validate our model. Our results show that if Vickrey auction
clearing mechanism can induce the sellers to reveal their true production costs and bid at competitive
level, the market performance can be almost pareto-efficient. The weighted average clearing method
in the poolco market results in the lowest market clearing price (MCP). However, the market clearing
quantity (MCQ) is also low which results in deadweight loss to the society. Our findings also show that
the different orders of market execution (bilateral and poolco) can significantly affect the performance
of the markets.

1

Introduction

California’s recent, failed attempt to deregulate its electrical power market casts a shadow of doubt on
the deregulation plans of other states, such as Nevada, Arkansas and New Mexico. In an effort to gain
a better understanding of what went wrong in California, and how in the future one can build efficient,
reliable markets, a number of researchers [2, 3, 8, 26, 30, 34, 33] have studied the deregulated aspects of
the US electricity market. These studies have greatly enhanced our understanding of the issues involved in
designing and administering deregulated electricity markets. However, most of the studies in the literature
are restricted to static situations, markets with too few players, small networks etc. Additionally, many
of the studies make assumptions such as perfect rationality, symmetric knowledge between players, global
decision making, etc., in order for the studies to be feasible. The advent of computer-based modeling allows
us to relax many of these constraints while maintaining the feasibility of our calculations. A number of
experimental studies investigate various forms of trading that are or can be used by electrical markets [7, 8,
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10, 13, 14, 18, 19, 22, 23, 35]. In particular, these studies investigate the design of, efficiency in, and market
power of a restructured electricity market under different forms of market clearing and competition.
The experimental work in electricity market restructuring (economics, in general) can be partitioned into
two broad classes. One is the human-based laboratory experiments, in which experiments are performed in
a controlled environment and the cash-motivated human subjects are used as agents [23]. 1 Human-based
laboratories provide a natural environment for individual preferences and their reaction to institutional and
regulatory changes to be studied. However, there are several limitations on the kinds of experiments that can
be performed using human subjects. For example, inability to scale to a realistic number of players, set up
complicated ‘rules of the game’, play out collusive and learning behavior, simulate the physical clearing of
contracts etc.
The other class is the computer-based experiments which use agent based computational models [22, 34, 27, 5, 6]. These models can address a number of complex and interrelated issues that cannot be
resolved using conventional economic models which are capable of providing solutions only in analytically
tractable ways. These models can be scaled easily to realistic levels. In this paper, we present M ARKE TECTURE, an agent-based, individualistic, highly scalable, computational model which provides a general
framework to study different markets, trading institutions and agents’ strategies. Our prototype focuses on
the electricity market and has several unique features that distinguish it from previously-studied models.
(i) Based on information from the United States Census and from a microscopic mobility simulator, the
M ARKETECTURE simulator generates for each individual (in the population considered) a time dependent,
spatio-temporal, non-linear, elastic demand profile. (ii) Consumers and power generators are endowed with
very realistic features, such as limited knowledge about other market entities, the ability to form into groups
and place bids and asks as aggregate groups, bounded rationality, etc. (iii) Parameterized and configurable
markets that allow different clearing mechanisms, matching algorithms, trading strategies. (iv) The electrical power grid, whose naturally limited capacity to deliver power from any generator to any consumer
affects the clearing price of power, is part of the model. The details of each of these features are described
in later sections of this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the overall schematic design
of our large-scale, microeconomic simulator. The basic design consists of four modules. The modules are
the mobility based model for creating individualized power consumption patterns, the supply, the market,
and the control module that coordinates the execution of a simulation. Section 3 discusses the algorithmic
aspects of our simulator. Section 4 describes a case study for the city of Portland, Oregon. The study yields
insights into the structural properties of the market. Section 5 describes some of the computational issues
involved in implementing the simulator. Finally section 6 concludes the paper.

2

Description of the M ARKETECTURE Simulator

Figure 1 depicts schematically the M ARKETECTURE simulator. It is made up of four main modules: control, supply, demand, and market. The supply, demand, and market modules contain entities, e.g., buyers,
sellers, markets, etc., whose actions and interactions drive the model. Each entity has a set of attributes that
determine its individual character. We now describe in greater detail each of these components.

2.1 Demand Module
The M ARKETECTURE simulator is designed to model the running of multiple market sessions over a long
period of time. Since a person’s demand for power varies over time (e.g., people tend to consume less power
when they sleep than when they are awake) it is important that this variation is modeled in as realistic a
1

For human based laboratory studies in other areas, see [15, 24, 28].
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Figure 1: The above diagram uses UML-like notation to show structure of Marketecture. The items in boxes
are classes. Each class represents a type of entity or a collection of entities of a certain type. There are
four modules in the simulator: S UPPLY, D EMAND, M ARKET, and C ONTROL. S UPPLY, D EMAND, and
M ARKET are depicted by boundaries that contain the classes that comprise each. The C ONTROL module
is depicted, without a border, in the center of the diagram. It contains no entities. Lines represent relations
between entities. Arrows represent the direction in which communication from one related entity to another
is initiated. The symbols “1” and “1..n” indicate the multiplicity of the relations. For instance, each B UYER
is associated with at least one and potentially many C ONSUMERS. Lines not having these multiplicity
symbols indicate one-to-one relations.
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manner as possible. The demand module of the M ARKETECTURE simulator is responsible for this modeling
task. This module has three primary classes, the UPM O STI NTERFACE, which gathers demand data from
a mobility simulator, called UPMoST [29]; the I NDIVIDUALS who move around the simulator and demand
power; and the L OCATIONS that I NDIVIDUALS visit.
2.1.1

UPM O STI NTERFACE

The UPM O STI NTERFACE interacts with an urban population mobility simulator developed at Los Alamos
National Laboratories called UPMoST [29]. The UPM O ST simulator produces, for each I NDIVIDUAL
in the simulator, activity and mobility information. The UPM O ST simulator, in turn, receives as input
actual demographic information on the population being simulated as well as information on the physical
infrastructure of the location being simulated, such as the geographic locations of buildings and roads. In
short, UPM O ST provides us with
- the power demand profiles of synthetic I NDIVIDUALS2 whose behavior is based on real demographic
data, and
- the physical location of each synthetic I NDIVIDUAL which allows us to determine the amount of
power demand at each physical location over the course of a day.
We are thus able to compute the power demand at each L OCATION in the simulator at any given time as a
function of the type of L OCATION, the number of I NDIVIDUALS at that L OCATION, and the type of activities
performed by those I NDIVIDUALS at that L OCATION at that time. We use hourly intervals to create the
demand profiles for each I NDIVIDUAL and L OCATION. The UPM O STI NTERFACE has no attributes. There
is only one instance of the UPM O STI NTERFACE.
2.1.2

L OCATION

A L OCATION represents the places where an I NDIVIDUAL is at any point in time, such as: a house, office,
shopping mall etc. In general, a L OCATION has no attributes. However, when the simulator is used to model
an actual city like Chicago or Portland, we associate with each L OCATION its UTM [31, 9] coordinates.
2.1.3

I NDIVIDUAL

An I NDIVIDUAL represents a person in the simulator. It has three attributes:
-      , the activity that is engaged in at a particular hour. The simulator recognizes a finite set of
activities, such as: shop, visit, school, social recreation, work, home etc. Each activity has certain
power requirements, represented by the attribute.
-   , the income of .
-  , the current L OCATION of .
The    and   attributes of each I NDIVIDUAL are used to determine the amount of power demand
in the system at any point in time. The attribute  determines the geographical distribution of the demand at
any point in time.
2
Synthetic individuals are people from a synthetic population. Our synthetic population is an imitation of the real population.
The synthetic population preserves the key features of the real population and has the same statistical properties (such as correlation
structure, joint distributions of the demographic variables, spatial distribution of households etc.) as the real population.
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2.2 Market Module
The market module can simulate a variety of power markets, each having a distinct clearing mechanism.
Currently, the M ARKETECTURE simulator models two markets: a P OOLCO M ARKET and a B ILATERAL M ARKET. In a bilateral market, a buyer and seller independently set up the physical and financial terms
of the trade and are responsible for dispatching and receiving the physical deliveries of the commodity. In
addition, the participants of the bilateral contract are also responsible for informing the independent system
operator (ISO) of the size, source and sink locations of the contract. In a poolco market model, the buyers
and sellers submit their bids and asks to the power exchange. The power exchange then dispatches A SK in
economic order until all the bids have been satisfied.
There are two classes of trading agents, B UYERS, who on behalf of C ONSUMERS go to the markets
and buy power, and S ELLERS, who on behalf of G ENERATORS sell power. Each market has one attribute: a
price cap  , which is the maximum price per unit of power for which power may be traded on that market.
There is only a single instance for each of the P OOLCO M ARKET and the B ILATERAL M ARKET .
2.2.1

B UYER

A B UYER represents a collection of C ONSUMERS (see below) and makes all economic decisions (with
respect to the power markets) on its constituent C ONSUMERS ’ behalf. For example, a B UYER could be the
head of the household, owner of McDonald’s, Wal-Mart etc. Each B UYER has one attribute: a list of the
  , that the buyer represents.
C ONSUMERS  
2.2.2

C ONSUMER

C ONSUMERS are not, in our model, people, nor are they agents that directly interact with the market.
C ONSUMERS are essentially the locations which are owned and represented by B UYERS. Each C ONSUMER
 has six attributes:
-

, a list of L OCATIONS that the Consumer represents.


-  , the B UYER who represents the C ONSUMER in the P OWER M ARKET.
-

, the B US from which  draws power.


-





  , a demand function of the form   

"!$#&%'

that maps quantities to prices.

, the fixed amount of power that  always needs.

- (  ')+* , the amount of power that  would like to buy.
The value of  ’s demand function ,  - at any point in time is based on the number of I NDIVIDUALS
at each L OCATION /. 01 and the quality of the location.
2.2.3

S ELLER

A S ELLER represents a collection of G ENERATORS and makes all economic decisions (with respect to the
power markets) on its constituent G ENERATORS ’ behalf. Each S ELLER 2 has the following attributes:
-

34 56

-

  8 , an invertible estimated market demand function of the form  
tities to prices
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, a list of G ENERATORS that the S ELLER represents.
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We assume that, for any S ELLER 2 
 
2.2.4

2

  5'  2 

, 2 does not know 2

,2 
 

, an asking strategy.

, where 2   is the asking strategy of 2  .

A SK (respectively, B ID)

An A SK (respectively, a B ID) represents the amount and quantity of power that a S ELLER (respectively,
B UYER) wishs to sell (respectively, buy). Each A SK (respectively, B ID) has three attributes:
5

(respectively,  ), the G ENERATOR (respectively, C ONSUMER) on whose behalf it is placed.

- ( , the quantity of power.
2.2.5

, the price per unit of power.
P OOLCO M ARKET

In each bidding round in a P OOLCO M ARKET, all S ELLERS and B UYERS submit to the market their respective bids and asks. On the supply side, each S ELLER 2 submits for each G ENERATOR 5 . 23 exactly one
A SK. On the demand side, each B UYER  submits a demand function which is a horizontal summation of all
its constituent C ONSUMERS ’ demand functions. It is the job of the P OOLCO M ARKET to satisfy the needs
of the B UYERS in as cheaply and fairly a way as possible. This is done by dispatching A SKS in economic
order, i.e., the cheapest A SK is dispatched first, followed by the next cheapest one, and so on, until all the
B IDS are served. To ensure fairness, at the end of each bidding round the unit price of all the power dispatched is the same, regardless of the unit prices asked by each S ELLER. We call this unit price the market
clearing price (MCP). Three distinct clearing policies for setting the MCP are considered: normal, Vickrey
auction and weighted average clearing. These clearing policies have either been implemented by ISOs like
PJM and California in the past or considered by theoreticians and experimentalists [1, 20, 21, 25].
In a normal clearing, the MCP is the price of the marginal A SK, i.e., the A SK having the greatest unit
price of all the A SKS dispatched by the Poolco market. When this clearing mechanism is used, S ELLERS
have an incentive to raise the unit price of their A SK beyond the competitive level. If the sellers are successful in inflating the price of the marginal A SK, every seller profits from it.3 However, this incentive is
counteracted by the possibility that, in raising the unit price asked, a S ELLER can be undersold by another
S ELLER. On the positive side, normal clearing induces producers to reduce their cost of production. The
uniform clearing price allows higher profit margins to cheap producers.
The Vickrey auction policy was designed to induce truthful revelation of production costs and efficient
dispatching [32]. In a Vickrey auction, the MCP is the price of the cheapest A SK not dispatched. Vickrey
suggested that if the price received by the S ELLER is independent of his A SK, i.e. if the sellers’ A SK and
his pay-off can be decoupled, all sellers would have an incentive to bid at their marginal cost. In such a
case, a S ELLER will be able to influence his payoff only to the extent that it affects the probability of his
G ENERATORS being called into operation. To maximize that probability, it would ask the marginal cost and
yet be guaranteed to have a positive return if it is called into operation. See [13] for more on Poolco and
Vickrey clearing mechanisms.
Under the weighted average clearing, MCP is determined by the weighted average price of all the A SKS
dispatched by the Poolco market where the weights are simply the quantities offered by each of the selected
S ELLERS. If S ELLERS are known to exercise market power, this clearing mechanism can keep the market
clearing price in check.
3

This behavior can also lead to economic inefficiency because the less efficient S ELLERS may submit lower asks than the more
efficient S ELLERS resulting in the dispatch of less efficient ones.
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2.2.6

B ILATERAL M ARKET

In a B ILATERAL M ARKET , B UYERS and S ELLERS pair off and independently negotiate the physical and
economic terms of the contracts. Each bilateral contract has to be submitted to the ISO for physical clearing.
The ISO determines if the power grid has enough transmission capacity to support the physical terms of the
contract. If (and only if) it does, the contract clears.

2.3 Demand Module
The demand module consists of the physical P OWER G RID, the independent systems operator (ISO), and
G ENERATORS. The P OWER G RID is made up of B USES and L INES.
2.3.1

P OWER G RID

The P OWER G RID is the graph-like physical infrastructure that delivers power from one location to another.
It has two parameters:
-



  



$



 

, a set of B USES (defined below).

  , a set of L INES (defined below).

There is only one instance of the P OWER G RID.
2.3.2

B US

A B US is a point at which power may be injected or removed from the P OWER G RID. A B US may also route
power to other B USES along different L INES (see below). Each B US  has two attributes:
-

$




  , the L INES that are connected to  .

- (   , the quantity of power currently injected into  .
-  , the phase angle.
2.3.3

L INE

A L INE transports power from one B US to another. Each L INE  has three attributes:
- ( 
  , the maximum amount of power that at any moment  may carry.
- (    , the amount of power currently flowing through  .
2.3.4

, the reactance of the line.


  

 

, the pair of B USES that  joins.

ISO

The ISO administers the P OWER G RID. From the perspective of the simulator, ISO is the interface between
the markets and the P OWER G RID. When, during a market session, negotiations for buying and selling power
reach a point where the market needs to validate that the P OWER G RID can physically deliver the power
being negotiated, the ISO is called in. The ISO then determines the feasibility of delivering the power
being negotiated by simulating the P OWER G RID with the negotiated power injected into the P OWER G RID.
The ISO has no attributes. There is only one instance of the ISO.
7

2.3.5

G ENERATOR

G ENERATORS produce electricity. Each G ENERATOR
5

has seven attributes:

- 2 , the S ELLER (defined below) that represents the G ENERATOR in the markets.


, the B US that connects 5 to the power grid.

-   + , an average total cost function of the form   

 (

;6(

!



that maps quantity to price.

- (   , the quantity of power that the 5 ’s S ELLER (defined below) plans to sell on the markets.
-



 )  , the fraction of the total quantity of power sold on the markets that 5 sells.

2.4 Control Module
The M ARKETECTURE simulator requires input in order to initialize each of the attributes of each entity in
the simulation. As mentioned above, C ONSUMERS are initialized by data from the UPMoST simulator. All
other entities are initialized by input files. Thus, the simulator is highly configurable at run time. The control
module has no entities, but rather controls the behavior of all the other entities in the simulator.

3

Algorithmic Description of the M ARKETECTURE Simulator

We now describe how the simulator works. A key feature of our design is that the simulator is highly
configurable at run time. It executes a sequence chosen from set of possible actions. The actual order in
which the actions are executed is determined by the user, who, before the simulation takes place, writes a
control script. Actions may be repeated multiple times. We now describe each of these actions in detail and
provide their run-time complexity.
For most of the discussion in this section we adopt the following notation: for an entity having attribute
; , we will use the “.” operator to denote the value of ; . For instance, given two C ONSUMERS   and  ,
   refers to  ’s B US and 0  refers to  ’s B US.
A M ARKETECTURE simulation begins in the control module, which initializes all the entities in the
simulator and then actually runs the simulation.

3.1 Initialization
During initialization, the control module of the simulator opens user-defined files, which determine all the
attributes of the the P OWER G RID, the number of C ONSUMERS, S UPPLIERS, G ENERATORS, and S ELLERS,
and initializes all of the attributes of these classes, except for the    - and (  ')*  of the C ONSUMERS,
which are determined by the RESET C ONSUMER algorithm (see below). The control module sets the global
variable  to zero and calls the RESET C ONSUMERS algorithm. Finally, it opens the control script and
processes it.
For the P OWER G RID and for each C ONSUMER, B UYER, G ENERATOR, and S ELLER , we call the value
assigned during initialization to the each of the attributes ; of the initial value of 1; .
The running time of initialization is  ?!
is the number of C ONSUMERS, is the
!  , where
number of G ENERATORS, and  is the number of B USSES in the simulation.
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3.2 Control Script Processing
The heart of a M ARKETECTURE simulation is the processing of the control script. The control script is
simply a text file having one line for each action the writer of the script wants the simulator to do. Here is
an example control script:
pricecap 100
bind random .25
runBilateralMarket
runPoolcoMarket Normal
reset
runPoolcomarket Vickrey
bind random .1
runBilateralMarket
runPoolcoMarket Wtdavg
bind random .2
runBilateralMarket
reset
...
As the above example shows, each line in the control script names one of four primary events: reset,
bind, runBilateralMarket, and runPoolCoMarket. The events runBilateralMarket and
runPoolCoMarket run a session of the market each event named after. The event bind determines
which B UYERS interact with which S ELLERS in the B ILATERAL M ARKET. The event R ESET increments
the simulation to the next bidding period and resets the entity attributes that have been changed during
market sessions. In the remainder of this section, we will describe each of these actions algorithmically. The following simple algorithm describes the process of reading and executing the control script.
Algorithm PROCESS C ONTROL S CRIPT
Foreach line  in the control script,
Call the algorithm corresponding to the event named in  .

The running of the control script does not have a fixed run-time complexity because its running time depends
heavily on the content of a particular script.
3.2.1

Reset Event

As market sessions run, the demand lessens, supply diminishes, and the P OWER G RID gets loaded with
power. These dynamics are captured by the attributes of each of the entities in the simulator. After the power sold on the market is spent, a new period of time for which power must be bought and
sold opens and the attributes of the entities need to be reset. This is the purpose of a reset event.
Note that, as in the example script above, it is possible to run multiple sessions of the same market between reset calls. In this case, subsequent sessions run before the next reset event reflect the
diminished demand and supply and increased load on the P OWER G RID caused by previous sessions.
Algorithm RESET
Let 

 



 

!


;
9

Foreach B US
Let 



.

in the P OWER G RID,

;

  

1(

Call RESET C ONSUMERS (defined below);
Call RESET G ENERATORS (defined below).





!
!
 , where  is the number of B USSES ,
The total running time of this algorithm is   !
is the number of G ENERATORS,
is the number of C ONSUMERS, and is the number of I NDI VIDUALS. The RESET C ONSUMERS algorithm is called both by the RESET algorithm and during the
initialization of the simulator. Its main purpose is to determine the demand C ONSUMERS have by
contacting the UPM O ST simulator. Note that the UPM O ST simulator is an entirely different system from M ARKETECTURE; it is not even necessary for it to run concurrently with a M ARKETEC TURE simulation, as long as the UPM O ST simulator has previously output the data necessary for the
M ARKETECTURE simulator to run. Note also that, because the infrastructure for getting the demand
data is encapsulated in the UPM O STI NTERFACE entity, the M ARKETECTURE simulator could easily be
adapted (by replacing the UPM O STI NTERFACE entity) to get its demand data from some other source.

Algorithm RESET C ONSUMERS
Foreach I NDIVIDUAL ,
Retrieve from the UPM O STI NTERFACE the attributes of for the current value of 

.

 

Foreach C ONSUMER  ,



Let

be the set of I NDIVIDUALS associated with  ;

Let 
Let #

      , that is,
     , that is,





by a small constant 5-;
Let ,8 

9 

"!$#&%'

Let 1(   )+*


#&

 

;

#



is the sum of all the income of each I NDIVIDUAL in multiplied

;

, where





is the sum of the activity coefficients of each I NDIVIDUAL in ;4



is the price;



 , where is the number of I NDIVIDUALS and
The running time of this algorithm is > !
is the number
of C ONSUMERS.
The RESET G ENERATORS algorithm is called both by the RESET algorithm and during the initialization of the simulator. The purpose of RESET G ENERATOR is to reset each G ENERATOR 5 ’s cost function
5, ' and to determine how much power S ELLER 5,2 will offer in the markets (i.e., the value of 51(  ).
4

The power demand at a location is the sum of the power demand that is independent of occupancy and the sum of the demand
functions for all individuals at that location. Therefore,

#.-)#
! "  #%$&  %')(*,+ +0/1%234
type   denotes the location that is used for activity type  , 5  is the quantity of power that is required at this location regardless
of the number of individuals present. The second term shows the demand that is a function of the occupancy.
  

type
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Figure 2: Display of oligopoly ( ) and competitive equilibrium ( ): MC represents the marginal cost, MR
the marginal revenue,  and (  the competitive price and quantity,  and (  the oligopoly price and quantity
respectively.
The asking behavior of each S ELLER 2 is based on the strategy S ELLER 2 wants to adopt. S ELLER can
select one of the three strategies i.e., competitor, oligopolist and competitive-oligopolist. Figure 2 shows how
51(  is determined. If 2,2  
 5  2 then 51(  is set to the point at which the marginal revenue
  is defined as   ( 2,   (  % ( .5
and the marginal cost functions intersect, where marginal revenue 2 
Note that, in our model, for some ; and  2,    ;>=$@ , 2 
 9  ; =8 @ . If 2,2    
 
  5  2
then 51(  is set to the point where the price equals the marginal cost. If 21;   
then 51(  is uniformly randomly picked to be between the above two extremes. 2 on behalf of each
G ENERATOR 5 . 23 offers a quantity, ( (  ), somewhere between the two extremes of what a competitive
and an oligopolistic S ELLER would offer. These extremes are represented, respectively, by 571(   ((  ) and
51(   ( (  ). Thus 571(  .
571(   +51(   . In contrast to the traditional Cournot oligopolist model, we
assume that 2 does not know the real market demand but is able to estimate it via 2 ’s estimated demand
function 2,   .6 Each S ELLER also has an estimate of the market share that it expects to sell 2   )  .
Algorithm RESET G ENERATORS
Let  be the total quantity of power traded on the markets since the last time RESET was called;
Foreach G ENERATOR 5 ,
Reset 5,



to its initial value;

Let 5
')    5  ')  !
time RESET was called;

* %



 %

, where 

Let 51(  be the unique quantity satisfying

5,2,

Let 51(  be the unique quantity satisfying 

 (

If 5,2,2 


 5  2

Let 51( 


(

*

is the quantity of power sold by 5 since the last
  (   5,     %( ;

 2,

  (  %( 7 5,    %( ;

, that is, if 5 ’s S ELLER ’ S asking strategy is oligopolistic,

 ;

Although we denote marginal revenue in a way usually reserved for attributes,  is not an attribute of the S UPPLIER class
because we can easily derive it from the estimated demand function attribute  .
6
attribute of the C ONSUMER is nonlinear, the linear estimates that  
provides allow for informaGiven that the    
tion asymmetry between the S ELLERS and the B UYERS.
5

( , 

, 
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Elseif 5,2,2 

 


Let 51( 


(

 

, that is, if 5 ’s S ELLER ’ S asking strategy is competitive,

 ;

Else
Choose 51(  by sampling uniformly from the range

The running time of this algorithm is
3.2.2



, where


(

 
(

  .

is the number of G ENERATORS.

RunPoolcoMarket Event

The P OOLCO M ARKET was described in detail in section 2.2.5. Here we describe the process
of running the P OOLCO M ARKET. In order to make it easier to understand, we break the running of the P OOLCO M ARKET into four phases: dispatching power, calculating the market clearing
price, calculating the bids (respectively, asks) of each C ONSUMER (respectively, G ENERATOR). The
following algorithm shows each of these four phases, which we describe below in greater detail.
Algorithm RUN P OOLCO M ARKET
DISPATCH P OWER;
CALCULATE MCP;
CALCULATE B IDS A NDA SKS ;
CONFIRM C ONTRACTS;



The total running time of this algorithm is > ?!
! 
 , where
is the number of G ENERATORS, and  is the number of B USSES.
In the first phase, we determine which G ENERATORS are called in.

is the number of C ONSUMERS,

Algorithm DISPATCH P OWER
Let





is the set of all

 A SKS ;
 ;7 5
.
3 
 ;1( 
51( 
 ;7

5,    ;71(   , where 3
  
is the set of all A SKS based on some G ENERATOR ’ S
G ENERATORS in the simulation, that is,
asking price  ;



 5 
be the A SKS in  listed in economic order, i.e.,
 
      ;
    , where is the set of all CONSUMERS in the simulator, that is,
Define  
  is the sum of all demand functions;
       , that is,     is the sum of all target demands;
Let    
Let  
 ! "  $#  %&('*) +       , where  (respectively,  )
Let

 ;

; 



;



;

&

;

9 

&

$.





0      ;

;



9

0,

9





)+*

:









01(

6

 

)+*



')+*

 ;

1(





- ;

is the quantity (respectively, price) of A SK ;  ;
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9

')+*

  

;

1(

;

.

Thus, the integer that is calculated in the last line of the above algorithm is the index of the A SK corresponding to the most expensive G ENERATOR that is called in. The sum of the demand functions of the
B UYERS are used to determine the value of .
 , where
is the number of C ONSUMERS and
The running time of this algorithm is > !
is the number of G ENERATORS. (The
term is from the required sorting on the A SKS of each
G ENERATOR that occurs in step 2 of the preceding algorithm.)
In the next phase, we determine the MCP, which depends on whether the clearing is Normal, Vickrey
or Weighted Average.





Algorithm COMPUTE MCP



Let 
If



 



  #



 1(

 ;

,


If we are running a Normal auction,

 ; 
;
Let 
Else if we are running a Vickrey auction,

Let 
;
 ;  
Else (i.e., if we are running a Weighted Average auction),
Let 




 #





 ;


 #

   ;  1(8 % 




;

 1( ;

Else



Let 

('*)


@


 




 





'

   ;

The running time of this algorithm is   , where is the number of G ENERATORS.
Next, we determine the B IDS and A SKS that are sent to the ISO for approval. Since A SKS were used
in the first two phases, we simply assign the MCP to the price attribute of the A SKS that were called in. We
may also need to modify the quantity field if there is a surplus.
Algorithm CALCULATE B IDS A NDA SKS
 
 &  - 
   ')*   ;
Let     
Let   )   

'*) +
' )  




Foreach /.



 

Let ; 
Let ; 
Let






;



 


1(







 

  ;



;

 1(    )    % 



 

 ;

;

Foreach C ONSUMER  ,

13

Let




- 0
 0,

 6 

 

 

)    %




 8 



 

;

The running time of this algorithm is  !
 , where
is the number of G ENERATORS and is the
number of C ONSUMERS.
Finally, we send these B IDS and A SKS to the ISO. If the ISO approves, we update the demand (respectively, supply) attributes of the C ONSUMERS (respectively, G ENERATORS).
Algorithm CONFIRM C ONTRACTS
Submit A SKS

;

;

 and each B ID  .

to the ISO for approval.

If the ISO approves,



Foreach /.

 


,

Let ;  51(   ;  51(  
Define ;  5,     (  ; 
Foreach B ID


=

 1( ;
;

   ( !

5,

;1(

;

,
.

Let  01(   )+* 
Define  0 ,8 

 0
 1(

  )+* =

1(

 
 ,

- 

;

 -9/=

 1(

;

The running time of this algorithm is > ! $!   , where
number of C ONSUMERS, and  is the number of B USSES.
3.2.3

is the number of G ENERATORS,

is the

Bind Event

The bind event is where S ELLERS and B UYERS are matched for an upcoming runBilateralMarket event.
There are two syntactical forms that bind event can take. In the first case, the form is
bind random num
where

num

is

a

floating

point

number

in

 .

In

Algorithm BIND
Let



.


Foreach (B UYER, S ELLER)

 '20

,

Let  be a floating point number sampled uniformly from
If 





Let

  
,



- '2 

;

The other form is
bind

  '28 

  8'2



  

'2
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 ;

this

case

the

algorithm

is

where

   '2 

  8'2 

  

'2

is a list of (B UYER, S ELLER) pairs. In this case the algorithm is


Algorithm BIND
Let



  '2 

-   '2 

  

'2

 

.

In either case, the running time of this algorithm is
is the number of G ENERATORS.
3.2.4

>





, where

is the number of C ONSUMERS and

RunBilateralMarket Event

The B ILATERAL M ARKET was described in detail in section 2.2.6. Before a runBilateralMarket event occurs, we assume that a bind event has occurred. The RUN B ILATERAL M ARKET algorithm takes one argucreated by the most recent bind event.
ment, the set of matchings



Algorithm RUN B ILATERAL M ARKET
Foreach

 '2 .



Foreach  0 +5
Let 

, where


.







is the latest set of matchings created by the BIND algorithm,
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,



be the unique quantity satisfying    ,-   5,      $      

 
 01(  ')*  +51(   

>+5, '      ;
If such a  exists,
Submit B ID  0 +57,      and A SK  57 +5,       to the ISO for approval;
If the ISO approves,
Let 51(   51(  = ;
Define 5,   ( 5,    ( !   ;
Let 1(   )+*  01(  ')+* = ;
Define ,8  69 0,   = ;

 '*)

'*)



Note that the order in which the (B UYER, S ELLER) pairs are chosen to negotiate contracts is significant.
Because the cost and demand functions are updated as soon as a contract is cleared, as a rule of thumb,
contracts that clear earlier will be for more power. The running time of this algorithm is >     , where
is the number of C ONSUMERS, is the number of G ENERATORS, and  is the number of B USSES.

3.3 Computing Power flow
The power flow problem is to compute the load on each L INE of a P OWER G RID given the power injected
into the grid. We ask the reader to refer to a standard text, e.g., [36], for an introduction to the topic.
Let 3 be the P OWER G RID. Recall that 3 has attributes , i.e., its set of  B USES, and  , its set of
L INES. One of the B USES  .
is designated the reference, or swing, B US. Let    .  denote the L INE
between B USSES and .

In some power flow models, each L INE    has an impedance        !
  where    is the
resistance and   is the reactance of the L INE. The input is a power injection vector
specifying
.
the power injected at each B US in the P OWER G RID; loads are simply negative injections. The output is a

vector  .
specifying the amount of current flowing through each L INE.
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Our simulator considers only the “linearized,” or the “DC,” load flow problem since the linearized version scales up easily. The power flow through    from B US to B US is



  =



  

 



 



where   and   are the phase angles at B USSES and [11].
Now, for each B US , the power  injected at the B US must equal the power flowing out of the B US.
Therefore,


  =

 



 



This gives us a system of linear equations   , where 


is the vector of phase angles at each B US, and
each B US,   
given by


 
 
 
 
 

=
=
=
=
=
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 #    # 
=









is the vector of power flow at
is the matrix L INE susceptances















The solution to the system of equations is obtained by computing the inverse  of and substituting

to solve for  . Knowing  and   and given   , we can compute the power flow through
in  

L INE    . Each L INE has a maximum power flow capacity. If the actual power flow through the L INE as
computed above exceeds this capacity, then we say that the physical constraints of the P OWER G RID are
violated.
Inverting occurs once during the simulation, during the initialization phase. It is >    , where  is
the number of B USSES.
The basic algorithm for computing power flow is run by the ISO when contracts are submitted to it for
approval. It updates the loads on the P OWER G RID B USES with the values specified by the B IDS and A SKS
(subtracting power for a B ID, adding power for an A SK). It then solves the power flow equations, where the
power vector is the vector of the (  attributes of the B USES. Note that, even though B IDS and A SKS
do not explicitly have a B US attribute, the corresponding B US can be found from the B US attribute  of the
B ID ’ S C ONSUMER  or A SK ’ S G ENERATOR 5 . If any of the lines exceed their capacity, the ISO removes
the power just loaded onto the P OWER G RID and disapproves the contracts. Otherwise, it approves them.
This algorithm takes two arguments: a list of the A SKS and a list of B IDS that need to be approved.



Algorithm APPROVE C ONTRACTS
Foreach A SK
;

.

Let ; 5 
Foreach B ID
Let  0 



1(



,

 

.

,

1(

 

; 5  1(

 0
  1(

  !

 =

;

;71(

 1(

;

Solve the powerflow equations;
Foreach L INE &.


, where  is the set of L INES in the P OWER G RID,
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If 1(  



1(  



Foreach A SK ; .
,
Let ; 5  1(   
,
Foreach B ID  .
Let  0    0 

; 5  1(

  =

  !

 1(

1(

;71(

;

;

Reject contracts;
Exit algorithm;
Approve contracts (note: if the algorithm gets this far, i.e., if it does not exit, then no line constraints have
been violated);

This algorithm is  ! !   , where (respectively,  ) is the number of A SKS (respectively, B IDS)
and  is the number of B USSES. >   is the amount of time it takes to solve the powerflow equations,

assuming that  has already been computed.
The preceding discussion of the modules, entities and algorithms used in Marketecture aims to show the
level of scale and detail that it can capture. This is a large-scale system, capable of handling transactions
between thousands of buyers and S ELLER who further represent millions of consumers and hundreds of
generators, respectively. Previously designed large-scale systems either do not represent individual behavior
or model individuals in such a way that their behavior is unrealistic [12]. Market simulators that model
realistic human behavior [24] have modeled it at such a high level of detail that they cannot easily scale
up to the size of our simulation. Our approach is a compromise between these two kinds of approaches.
We model individual behavior by providing market entities with parameters. These parameters allow each
entity an individual character but these are not so detailed that the simulator does not scale. The goal is to
capture different behavior of the system using different sets of parameters. A parameterized representation
allows efficient use of computational resources. Such representations are also valuable from the standpoint
of extensibility. The design and architect of our system is set up in such a manner that other commodity
markets can be studied with minimal modifications.

4

A Case Study

We now use Marketecture to perform a study that evaluates the performance and efficiency of the P OOL CO M ARKET and B ILATERAL M ARKET markets under different trading institutions and orders of market
execution. This study analyzes different strategies of the S ELLER and a range of different trading arrangements to determine which combinations lead to higher market efficiency and social welfare through their
impact on market clearing price, market clearing quantity, buyers’ surplus, sellers’ surplus and dead weight
loss to the society.
There have been several experimental studies done in the literature which address similar issues. [13]
uses a game theoretic approach to show that if the pool settlement price is modified to use Vickrey auction
clearing, it would remove the ability of the S ELLER to influence the clearing price and make the marginal
cost bidding the dominant bidding strategy. Work by [22] uses an agent based modeling approach to understand the issues of market power and efficiency in a wholesale electricity market. [10] compares results
of a sealed bid offer market mechanism and a uniform price double auction mechanism in a spot electricity
market. The comparison of performance is done in terms of market efficiency, buyer and seller profitability
and the delivery price. Their results show that the sealed bid offer mechanism performs better than the
uniform price double auction mechanism. [23] uses cash motivated human laboratory to compare the two
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alternative institutional arrangements for the trading of electric power. Day-ahead sealed bid trading and the
continuous double auction trading is used to measure the efficiency, distribution of surplus between B UYER
and S ELLER and the effect of location on prices and profitability. [4] uses an agent based simulation model
of the wholesale market for electricity in England and Wales to study the impact of uniform versus discriminatory clearing prices which were implemented as SMP (System Marginal Pricing) and pay-as-bid clearing
rules respectively.
Our study uses multiple market clearing mechanisms and multiple seller’s strategies to determine the
performance of the different markets. Several different combinations of markets, strategies and clearing
mechanisms are analyzed with a high level of detail, accuracy and realism.

4.1 Market Performance and Efficiency
The parameters used in this study to measure the market performance and efficiency are (i) buyers’ surplus,
(ii) sellers’ surplus, (iii) pareto efficiency/social welfare/deadweight loss, (iv) market clearing price and (v)
market clearing quantity. Similar measures have also been considered by other researchers in the electricity
literature [10], [23], [4].
Buyers’ surplus is measured as the difference between the amount of money that a B UYER actually pays
for quantity and the amount he would be willing to pay for quantity rather than do without it. Sellers’
surplus is calculated as the difference between the S ELLER’s total revenue and its variable costs. Pareto
efficiency is measured by the percentage of dead weight loss to the society or the proportion of maximum
surplus captured by the B UYER and S ELLER. If theoretically, the maximum surplus available to the society
is 100 and sum of S ELLER and buyers’ surplus is only 95 , then the dead weight loss to the society is 5
and the pareto efficiency is 95 . We use the total surplus available under the competitive strategy and normal
clearing as the theoretically maximum surplus possible under the P OOLCO M ARKET. All other strategies
are compared with the competitive strategy to determine the dead weight loss. In the B ILATERAL M ARKET
also, the competitive strategy is considered to be pareto efficient. This definition of efficiency is consistent
with the measure used in [23]. The market clearing algorithms used for the P OOLCO M ARKET clearing
are normal, Vickrey auction and weighted average clearing. For the B ILATERAL M ARKET , this study uses
the random matching probability of 1 to pair the B UYER and S ELLER which means that all B UYER and
S ELLER have access to each other and can potentially pair with each other given their demand and supply functions. In both B ILATERAL M ARKET and P OOLCO M ARKET the S ELLER can choose between the
previously mentioned three business strategies; competitor (C), oligopolist (O) and competitive-oligopolist
(B).




4.2 Input Parameters
This study uses the synthetic population data on 1.6 million individuals for the city of Portland, Oregon. The
previously mentioned UPMoST (Urban Population Mobility Simulation Technology) tool created a regional
population imitation of Portland with demographics closely matching the real population [29]. The spatiotemporal demand profiles for every hour, total of 24 hours, were constructed for each of the 1.6 million
individuals using the technique given in Section 2.1.
The 1.6 million individuals in Portland are distributed over 243,000 spatial locations. These locations
are represented by the entity Consumer in our simulation. Each of the 243,000 locations are further assigned
to 400 buyers on a random basis. On the supply side, 40 generators were assigned to 40 different sellers.
Based on the cost function, an estimated market share and an estimated linear market demand function, each
S ELLER calculates its profit maximizing price and output level for the three strategies explained above.
Each simulation run is performed for 24 hours. In each hour, the market is run 4 times to give multiple
chances to the B UYER and S ELLER to meet their targets for the hour. The B UYER aim is to meet the sum of
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the target demand for all its C ONSUMER and the sellers’ aim is to sell the profit maximizing output calculated
for the hour. A price cap is set at 100 per MW for both the P OOLCO M ARKET and B ILATERAL M ARKET .

4.3 Summary of Results
Table 1 shows the market clearing price (MCP), market clearing quantity (MCQ), buyers’ surplus, sellers’
surplus and the dead weight loss (DWL) to the society for the P OOLCO M ARKET and B ILATERAL M ARKET
under each of three strategies of the S ELLER. Each of the numbers shown in the table are hourly averages
calculated over a 24 hour period. The buyer’s surplus is calculated by summing up all its corresponding
consumers’ surplus. Note that the surplus for the inelastic part of the demand curve is bounded by the price
cap. For S ELLER, the profits plus the fixed cost determine the surplus. The fixed cost has been added to the
surplus to reflect that the S ELLER consider the fixed costs to be sunk cost which will be incurred no matter
whether the S ELLER actually sells anything or not. A S ELLER who does not get called in the market to
serve the load will have zero surplus by this definition. The dead weight loss is that part of the surplus that
neither goes to the B UYER nor to the S ELLER.
Poolco Model
1. The results for the P OOLCO M ARKET are summarized in Table 1. Panel 1 shows that the system
is pareto-efficient under normal clearing and competitive strategy. The surplus generated here is
used as a benchmark to calculate the DWL in the other P OOLCO M ARKET clearing mechanisms
and strategies. The DWL to the society under competition is zero and quantity cleared is the
highest.
2. If Vickrey auction clearing mechanism really induces the S ELLER to reveal their true production
costs and bid at competitive level, the market performance is almost pareto-efficient. This is
shown in the first row of Panel 2 where Vickrey clearing and competitive strategy is followed.
The MCP is only marginally higher and the dead weight loss is almost zero. Higher MCP results
in slightly higher sellers’ surplus and lower buyers’ surplus.
3. Even if Vickrey clearing does not lead to revelation of true costs but induces the S ELLER to move
from the oligopolistic strategy to competitive-oligopolist strategy, it reduces the dead weight loss
to the society by more than 11 and increases the buyers’ surplus by 13 .




4. If the P OOLCO M ARKET clearing algorithm is Vickrey and yet the S ELLER continue to behave
like oligopolists, the market performance is worse than it is under normal and weighted average
clearing.
5. If weighted average clearing method is used to clear the P OOLCO M ARKET, the MCP is the
lowest resulting in the highest buyers’ surplus and lowest sellers’ surplus. The dead weight loss
and the MCQ are only marginally different as compared to other P OOLCO M ARKET clearing
mechanisms. This holds for all three different strategies.
6. Among the four different P OOLCO M ARKET clearing algorithms, the worst outcome is realized
when Vickrey auction with ‘  ’ strategy is used. The MCP is the highest, the MCQ is the lowest,
the dead weight loss is the highest and the consumer surplus is the lowest.
Bilateral Model
1. In the B ILATERAL M ARKET , the average total cost (ATC) curve is offered as the supply curve no
matter what the strategy of the S ELLER is. Different business strategies are used to only create
different upper bounds on the quantity offered. If the strategy is competitive, i.e. 5,2,2  
 
 , the S ELLER offers the ATC curve bounded by 51(   (  , if the strategy is
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oligopolistic i.e. 5,2,2    5  2 , the ATC curve is bounded by 51(    (  , and if the
strategy is competitive-oligopolist, it is bounded by 51(  where 571(  is sampled uniformly
from the range (   (   .
2. The average contract price per unit in the B ILATERAL M ARKET is much less than the average
price in the P OOLCO M ARKET. The reason being that in the P OOLCO M ARKET, every S ELLER
gets paid the same price as bid by the marginal S ELLER. This results in a more inefficient
uniform pricing.
3. The absolute value of the buyers’ and sellers’ surplus in the B ILATERAL M ARKET is much lower
than in the P OOLCO M ARKET. This is due to the fact that individual contracts are being negotiated in the B ILATERAL M ARKET resulting in more efficient pricing of contracts.
4. The relative value of the surplus is much higher for the B UYER than for the S ELLER in the
B ILATERAL M ARKET as compared to the P OOLCO M ARKET.7 This is because the S ELLER are
bidding at the ATC in the B ILATERAL M ARKET . Also, due to the uniform pricing rule in the
P OOLCO M ARKET S ELLER get paid much higher than their bid price resulting in a higher surplus
for the S ELLER.
5. Note that the average clearing price under competitive strategy is higher than the oligopolist
strategy. This is because when more quantity is sold, the price cap is triggered more often
resulting in a higher average price. To confirm that this indeed is the reason, we removed the
price cap and found that the average price under ‘  ’ strategy is lower than the average price
under ‘  ’ strategy.

Table 1
Market Performance and Efficiency Results
Strategy

MCP

C
B
O

12.53
22.83
32.01

C
B
O

12.76
22.59
32.15

C
B
O

5.94
13.75
28.48

C
B
O

7.18
7.22
6.94

MCQ

Buyer Surplus( ) Seller Surplus( ) Deadweight Loss( )
Panel 1: Poolco Model - Normal Clearing
1800
78.03
21.97
0
998
55.61
31.67
12.71
715
42.96
33.12
23.90
Panel 2: Poolco Model - Vickrey Auction Clearing
1791
77.33
22.57
0.09
1011
55.92
31.69
12.38
714
42.79
33.25
23.94
Panel 3: Poolco Model - Weighted Average Clearing
1769
92.70
5.12
2.17
1034
70.50
18.32
11.17
715
47.09
28.99
23.91
Panel 5: Bilateral Model
1806
95.17
4.83
0
1354
71.49
4.23
24.27
903
47.36
3.20
49.42






Table 2 shows the market performance when both B ILATERAL M ARKET and P OOLCO M ARKET are
allowed to run in a certain order within the hour. Each market player is given a chance to play in the
7

We use the total surplus generated in the B ILATERAL M ARKET with
in the B ILATERAL M ARKET.
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strategy to calculate the DWL for the


and


strategies

B ILATERAL M ARKET and P OOLCO M ARKET to fulfill the target demand and sell the desired output. Two
iterations of B ILATERAL M ARKET and two iterations of P OOLCO M ARKET are run in each hour. Different
scenarios are run using different orders of market execution to analyze the effect of ordering on the performance of the market. In the first scenario, two iterations of the B ILATERAL M ARKET are run before the two
P OOLCO M ARKET iterations. The results from this scenario are shown in the first three panels of Table 2.
The only difference in these panels is that different P OOLCO M ARKET clearing algorithms are used in the
P OOLCO M ARKET. Normal, Vickrey and weighted average clearing results are shown in panels 1, 2 and 3
respectively.
In the second scenario the order of execution for the B ILATERAL M ARKET and P OOLCO M ARKET is
reversed. Now the two P OOLCO M ARKET iterations are run before the two B ILATERAL M ARKET iterations.
Results from the second scenario are shown in panels 4, 5 and 6 of Table 2. Again, normal, Vickrey and
weighted average clearing is used in the P OOLCO M ARKET and the results are displayed in panels 4 ,5
and 6 respectively. The DWL for each of the panels in Table 2 has been calculated by using a benchmark
total surplus generated when both B ILATERAL M ARKET and normal P OOLCO M ARKET were run under ‘  ’
strategy. For example, Panels 1-3 use the benchmark total surplus generated when B ILATERAL M ARKET
followed by normal P OOLCO M ARKET is run with a ‘  ’ strategy. Panels 4-6 use the benchmark total surplus
generated when normal P OOLCO M ARKET followed by B ILATERAL M ARKET is run with a ‘  ’ strategy.
Order of Market Execution
If B ILATERAL M ARKET is run first, more volume get traded at a cheaper price since prices on average
are lower in the B ILATERAL M ARKET market than P OOLCO M ARKET.
The buyers’ surplus is much higher when B ILATERAL M ARKET is run before P OOLCO M ARKET. This
is because when B ILATERAL M ARKET is run first, all the inelastic demand is served in this market.
Given that the S ELLER are only charging average total cost and there is no uniform pricing rule like
the P OOLCO M ARKET, the sellers’ surplus is much lower in the B ILATERAL M ARKET .





The total volume traded i.e.      !
     is higher when P OOLCO M ARKET is run before the
B ILATERAL M ARKET. The reason being that all the inelastic demand has to be met in the market that
runs first even if it is expensive. Once the inelastic demand is served in the P OOLCO M ARKET, the B I LATERAL M ARKET is run which is usually much cheaper than the P OOLCO M ARKET. The downward
sloping demand functions allow higher quantities to be bought in the B ILATERAL M ARKET. The flip
side of this behavior is shown in the first three panels where P OOLCO M ARKET is run after B ILATERAL M ARKET. The volume traded in the B ILATERAL M ARKET is high but in the P OOLCO M ARKET
it is really low. This is because all the inelastic demand is met in the B ILATERAL M ARKET which
had run first. The rest of the demand is price elastic. This, when offered in the relatively expensive
P OOLCO M ARKET, results in low volume traded in the P OOLCO M ARKET.
The DWL to the society increases consistently as S ELLER move from being competitive to
competitive-oligopolist to just oligopolists no matter what the order of execution is. When the B I LATERAL M ARKET is run first, the DWL is higher than the DWL when P OOLCO M ARKET is run first.
This is true under all three strategies. This is because when B ILATERAL M ARKET is run first total
volume traded is much lower.
Panel 6 shows that when weighted average P OOLCO M ARKET is run before the B ILATERAL M ARKET
with a ‘  ’ strategy, the DWL is -4.19. This simply means that the benchmark total surplus that was
chosen with the expectation that normal P OOLCO M ARKET will always lead to highest quantity traded
and hence most efficiency is not true. The DWL is the loss generated from both the markets. When
weighted average P OOLCO M ARKET is run first, the volume traded in that market was the lowest in
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comparison with the other P OOLCO M ARKET clearing mechanisms under ‘  ’ strategy. This allowed
more quantity to be traded under B ILATERAL M ARKET (after the weighted average P OOLCO M AR KET) resulting in surplus higher than what was generated in Panel 5 under normal P OOLCO M ARKET
with a ‘  ’ strategy.

Table 2
Results from Different Order of Market Execution



Strategy

5

C
B
O

7.17
6.97
6.97

C
B
O

7.18
7.28
6.96

C
B
O
Strategy

7.16
6.92
6.97










C
B
O

5.42
5.96
7.70

C
B
O

5.43
6.25
7.71

C
B
O

4.28
7.00
7.70





 





   B.Surplus( ) S.Surplus ( )
Panel 1: Bilateral Followed by Normal Poolco
1799
12.91
70
83.60
16.40
1359
16.48
67
71.07
4.53
901
29.23
18
46.83
3.41
Panel 2: Bilateral Followed by Vickrey Poolco
1806
13.77
0
92.30
4.69
1353
19.75
0
73.38
3.77
902
34.20
4
46.16
3.17
Panel 3: Bilateral Followed by Weighted Average Poolco
1799
1
68
94.18
4.68
1363
8.54
21
70.30
3.86
901
26.04
18
46.86
3.38
   

   
B.Surplus
S.Surplus
 
Panel 5: Normal Poolco Followed by Bilateral
1776
12.41
1819
76.97
23.02
1365
22.85
997
55.85
31.81
870
34.39
667
40.78
35.37
Panel 6: Vickrey Poolco Followed by Bilateral
1778
12.68
1803
76.22
23.55
1361
23.41
977
54.96
32.32
870
34.49
666
40.78
35.37
Panel 7: Weighted Average Poolco Followed by Bilateral
1880
3.82
1561
98.24
5.95
1301
14.49
935
68.23
17.02
870
30.19
666
45.17
30.97


















DWL( )


0
24.39
49.75
3.00
22.84
50.66
1.13
25.83
49.75
DWL
0
12.33
23.84
0.22
12.70
23.87
-4.19
14.74
23.85

Computational Issues

In this section, we describe our experiences with the computational issues involved in designing and implementing our simulation tool in order to perform large-scale simulations. The running time of each of the
component algorithms was discussed in Section 3.

5.1 Computing power demand
We compute the power demand at any given time of day as a function of the activities and demographics of
approximately 1.6 million I NDIVIDUALS spread over roughly a quarter million distinct locations. This input
data is obtained from the micro-simulation performed by the UPM O STI NTERFACE for I NDIVIDUALS in a
medium-sized urban area.
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For reasons of modularity of the code, we currently perform this step as a pre-processing phase. The
input to the pre-processing phase is a set of the activities and demographic information generated by the
UPM O STI NTERFACE. The output is a set of 24 files giving the aggregated demand profile (essentially, the
coefficients of a demand function) for each hour of the day at all locations. In order to discover the demand
profile at a given location during a given hour, one can simply load the demand profiles from the appropriate
hour.
It is possible to perform this step as a separate pre-processing phase because we have an a priori fixed
time step (1 hour) which defines the smallest granularity of simulated time during the course of the simulation. However, we would like to implement the more elegant solution of querying a database server for the
demand profile at a given location during an arbitrary window of time. In a parallel computing environment,
this database could even be distributed by partitioning it according to the topology of the grid. The demand
at a given location changes over time only as a result of a change in the activities performed at the location or
the occupancy of the location. If such changes are small, a very efficient caching strategy can be developed
to reduce the database lookup time.

5.2 Demand Functions



The aggregation step described in step 3 of algorithm DISPATCH P OWER computes the sum   6 of
individual demand functions. The implication is that at any price per unit power , the value of 9
denotes the aggregate demand at . However, with the introduction of discontinuous constraints, such as
the maximum target demand attribute (   )+* for each C ONSUMER, this is no longer true. Consequently, we
have to carefully consider the semantics of the disaggregation step in algorithm CALCULATE B IDS A NDA SKS
when the net power cleared in the market is partitioned among individual C ONSUMERS.
Consider a small example with two demand functions   9   !
%' and  89 
!
%'
and target demands   
and  
. Then, the aggregate target demand is     !  

!
%' . At

 which
and the aggregate demand function is 9 
, we compute   
does not exceed the aggregate target demand  . Hence, we conclude that the aggregate demand in the
      
7
market is at least 120 units of power. However, we find that
and
 
so that the actual aggregate demand is at most
. This
 8    
7
!
>
 
example illustrates the case precisely when, for some ,
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'*)   
  



 

  9
  . We then have a discrepancy between the actual aggregate demand and the
even though
aggregate demand computed by evaluating the aggregate demand function.
Another issue is that the function 9 is the sum of demands of all BUYER at price . However, for
sufficiently large , some C ONSUMERS ’ demand functions may evaluate to a negative value. Whenever a
C ONSUMER ’ S demand function is negative, it means that the C ONSUMER is not willing to buy any power
at that price. Therefore, the actual aggregate demand at price is really the sum of the demands of only the
C ONSUMERS whose demand at price is non negative.
The problems arise from the fact that the demand functions are only piecewise continuous, but we
represent the demand function as a sum of continuous functions. In order to solve the problem in its full
generality, we would require an implementation of functions that are piecewise continuous and an additional
(horizontal sum) operation for a set of such functions. The actual aggregate demand at a given price would
then be computed by summing the actual demand of each C ONSUMER (the minimum of the value of the
demand function and the target demand of the C ONSUMER) and summing over the C ONSUMERS. This can
be prohibitively expensive if the number of C ONSUMERS is large.
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5.3 Power flow
Computing the load on each L INE in the power grid using the “linearized” DC method involves solving a
system of linear equations. The coefficients in this system are the susceptances of the power L INES, which

do not change during the course of the simulation. Hence, the inverse,  , of the matrix of coefficients
is computed only once and cached in a separate file. Further runs of the simulation that use the same power

grid simply load the inverse matrix,  , from this file without having to recompute it. This method can
provide substantial savings in computation time for large grids. We thus avoid the     matrix inversion
operation via either LU decomposition or Gaussian elimination at every run of the simulator. We still incur
the >   running time of back substitution for computing the actual load on each L INE whenever the
power injected or power extracted changes at a substation. The running time of the DC powerflow code on
an i86-based PC running Linux was less than a minute.
In future work, we would like to take advantage of the sparse nature of the system of equations to reduce
the memory requirements and to parallelize the code.

6

Conclusions

This paper introduces Marketecture, and describes its various features in detail. Marketecture is a simulation
based tool for analyzing electricity markets. It can provide insight into the qualitative dynamics of the
markets and verify commonly held intuitions about how markets respond to changes in the pricing strategies
and gaming opportunities with a lot of detail, accuracy and realism. It provides a large degree of flexibility
via its ability to vary levels of aggregation, cost functions, demand functions, market clearing rules and
matching algorithms. These capabilities, combined with the use of a simple language for configuring a
simulation run, enable a wide range of market studies.
We perform a case study for the city of Portland, Oregon using the B ILATERAL M ARKET and P OOLCO M ARKET. We evaluate the efficiency and performance of these markets under different sellers’ strategies
and market clearing algorithms. Our results show that the markets are pareto efficient if sellers’ bid competitively and normal clearing is used in the P OOLCO M ARKET. The second best outcome in the P OOLCO M ARKET occurs when Vickrey auction clearing mechanism is able to induce S ELLER to reveal their true
production costs and bid at competitive levels. The market clearing price can be reduced further if weighted
average clearing method is used to clear the P OOLCO M ARKET. However, weighted average clearing results
in lower MCQ and higher dead weight loss making it an unattractive alternative.
The average contract price in the B ILATERAL M ARKET is significantly less than the average price in the
P OOLCO M ARKET for all three strategies. This is due to the fact that in our model, B ILATERAL M ARKET
S ELLER use their ATC curves to negotiate a price. Also, in the P OOLCO M ARKET, every S ELLER gets paid
the same price per unit as bid by the marginal S ELLER. This results in a more inefficient uniform pricing.
Our study also shows that different orders of market execution can be important in significantly affecting
the performance of the markets. Based on two different execution orders, our model finds that the overall
market performance is better when P OOLCO M ARKET is run before the B ILATERAL M ARKET .
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